Oil: the third rail of the Iraq debate

Only the "loony left" thinks the invasion of Iraq was about oil, right? Recall what press secretary Ari Fleischer said in February 2003:

if this had anything to do with oil, the position of the United States would be to lift the sanctions so the oil could flow. This is not about that.

Then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said something very similar at the time:

"We don't take our forces and go around the world and try to take other people's real estate or other people's resources, their oil. That's just not what the United States does," he said. "We never have, and we never will.

November 2002, Rumsfeld told CBS News that the confrontation with Iraq: "has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil."***

However, in the November 2007 American Prospect, journalist John Judis admits that the neocons and other Bush officials were privately talking about oil interests back in fall 2002. Those discussions were off-the-record, however, so the norms of journalism apparently prevented him from revealing their motives when it might have prevented war.

In the buildup to the war, and during the invasion and occupation, Bush officials, who were eager to advertise Iraq's nuclear threat, were reluctant to talk about oil, but in off-the-record interviews I conducted in December 2002, neo-conservatives waxed poetic about using Iraq's oil wealth to undermine OPEC.

Judis also notes that some former high ranking Republicans have now publicly acknowledged that oil was a driving factor for Iraq policy even before 9/11:

After he left office, former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill recounted National Security Council discussions about Iraqi oil. And in his recently published memoir, Alan Greenspan wrote, "I'm saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows -- the Iraq war is largely about oil."

President Bush, October 25, 2006, put his own spin on the oil angle:

If we do not defeat the terrorists or extremists in Iraq, they will gain access to vast oil reserves...And I know it's incumbent upon our government and others who enjoy the blessings of liberty to help those moderates succeed because, otherwise, we're looking at the potential of this kind of world: a world in which radical forms of Islam compete for power; a world in which moderate governments get toppled by people willing to murder the innocent; a world in which oil reserves are controlled by radicals in order to extract blackmail from the West...

Even prior to the war, however, it should have been obvious that much of the Arab world would see the situation as "war for oil."

Indeed, realist academic war critics like John Mearsheimer argued before the war began that the U.S. would be perceived as establishing a "giant gas station" in Iraq.

The second point I would make about occupation is we have a massive public relations problem in the Arab and Muslim world. People there really hate us. The idea that we're going to come in, conquer that place, bring in a pro council (sic) ... right? ... turn it into a giant gas station, and that's not going to further enrage people in the Arab and Muslim world against us, escapes me. I just don't see how that's going to happen. So I think it's going to make our terrorism problem worse, not better.

In a debate sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations in February 2003, Mearsheimer's frequent coauthor (and debate colleague) Steve Walt of Harvard elaborated:

the point was not about whether or not we were going to war for that reason, it's how our occupation will be perceived in the region, and what its regional consequences will be. And it is I think very, very likely that after we occupy Iraq and after we are there for five or ten years, we will be seen as a quasi colonial power. We will be pumping oil out of it ... not immediately, but after a number of years ... and this will be seen as exploitation, perhaps illegitimately.

It is frequently argued -- even by President Bush -- that the violence in Iraq will not end without a political resolution that includes some kind of plan to divide Iraq's oil wealth. In the latest twist, the Iraqi central government says it is going to punish oil companies that have signed separate deals with the Kurds.

The stakes are very high.

Since 2002, oil-producing Arab countries have seen their revenues triple -- "the number you usually hear is $700 billion of profit."

Somewhat perversely, these revenues provide Iraq's neighbors with very little incentive to push for peace. After all, peace and stability might bring reduced oil prices...




*** In this same interview, Rumsfeld was asked about the potential length of the Iaq war: ""Five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than that."

Visit this blog's homepage.

At the Duck

Readers might be interested in my recent posts at the Duck of Minerva blog:

Today, I blogged "Sarah Sewall and COIN." It concerns the efforts of the leader of a Harvard Human Rights center to make counterinsurgency less deadly to civilians.

Thursday, October 11, I blogged "Securing Our Survival" about a security conference at the University of Pittsburgh. The meeting focused on both global warming and nuclear proliferation.

Tuesday, October 2, I took note of a University of Chicago professor's appearance on Comedy Central: "Mearsheimer on Colbert."

Visit this blog's homepage.

Realist fantasies?

I finally got around to reading "The Israel Lobby," a controversial piece published in the London Review of Books, March 23, 2006, by John Mearsheimer of University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard.

The article has been much-discussed and raises all sorts of interesting empirical claims and substantive arguments. Mearsheimer and Walt, recall, authored a much-read article in advance of the Iraq war arguing that the looming military confrontation was unnecessary -- and likely a bad idea.

Since they are realists who believe that most states behave according to realist logic most of the time, the Iraq war poses something of a puzzle. Why did the US go to war? Their answer: it served the purposes of the Israeli lobby. Domestic interests, acting virtually as foreign agents, took the US into war against Iraq.

Despite this remarkable claim, and others, I am most interested in the authors' great emphasis on public debate.

Controlling the public debate is one of "the Lobby's" central strategic purposes, according to Mearsheimer and Walt.

it strives to ensure that public discourse portrays Israel in a positive light, by repeating myths about its founding and by promoting its point of view in policy debates. The goal is to prevent critical comments from getting a fair hearing in the political arena.

The Lobby uses its influence to control debate in Congress as well.

The Lobby doesn’t want an open debate, of course, because that might lead Americans to question the level of support they provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel organisations work hard to influence the institutions that do most to shape popular opinion.

The authors provide some evidence that the Lobby manages to dominate think tanks and media outlets and is working to stifle open debate on college campuses.

Here's the punchline -- and remember they're supposed to be hard-nosed realists, not "fantasy theorists" interested in public deliberation:

the Lobby’s campaign to quash debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing sceptics by organising blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that critics are anti-semites – violates the principle of open debate on which democracy depends. The inability of Congress to conduct a genuine debate on these important issues paralyses the entire process of democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their case and to challenge those who disagree with them, but efforts to stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned....

Although the Lobby remains a powerful force, the adverse effects of its influence are increasingly difficult to hide. Powerful states can maintain flawed policies for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored for ever. What is needed is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a more open debate about US interests in this vital region. Israel’s well-being is one of those interests, but its continued occupation of the West Bank and its broader regional agenda are not. Open debate will expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided US support and could move the US to a position more consistent with its own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well.

A more complete version of this article is available at a Harvard website, as is a critique penned by Alan Dershowitz.



Visit this blog's homepage.

Filed as: Mearsheimer Walt

Stop worrying and love the bomb

I really enjoy reading foreign policy op-ed pieces authored by realist scholars of international relations.

Then again, who doesn't love contrarian thinkers?

February 27, Barry Posen published the latest provocative op-ed piece, "We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran," in the New York Times:

An Iranian nuclear arsenal, policymakers fear, could touch off a regional arms race while emboldening Tehran to undertake aggressive, even reckless, actions.

But these outcomes are not inevitable, nor are they beyond the capacity of the United States and its allies to defuse. Indeed, while it's seldom a positive thing when a new nuclear power emerges, there is reason to believe that we could readily manage a nuclear Iran.

Actually, this editorial is fairly tame by realist standards.

Here are the opening lines from a press release issued three years ago today by Columbia University, which was entitled, "Spread of Nuclear Weapons Nothing to Fear, Says Waltz":

It does not matter if Iraq and North Korea possess or develop weapons of mass destruction, according to Kenneth Waltz, adjunct professor of political science and senior research scholar in the Institute of War and Peace. Nuclear deterrence, he says, will prevent either country from ever using them.

Similarly, John Mearsheimer and Steve Walt argued in advance of the war with Iraq that the US could easily deter even a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein:

In fact, the historical record shows that the United States can contain Iraq effectively - even if Saddam has nuclear weapons - just as it contained the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Mearsheimer wrote these words in Foreign Affairs Summer 1993:

The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent.

In August 1990, Mearsheimer published these words in The Atlantic:

the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope for avoiding war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence; hence some nuclear proliferation is necessary, to compensate for the withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals from Central Europe. Ideally, as I have argued, nuclear weapons would spread to Germany but to no other state.

If you haven't seen "Dr. Strangelove," do yourself a favor and rent it this weekend.


3/3/06 Update: How could I forget Pakistan and India? Mearsheimer, May 29, 1998, on "PBS Newshour":

I think once the two sides develop rather robust and large nuclear deterrence that you'll have a relatively stable situation, much like you had between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War....The fact of the matter is that nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent. And for a country that feels threatened, especially by a neighbor that has nuclear weapons, it's not very likely that that country is going to shoot nuclear weapons.

Mearsheimer acknowledged an elevated risk of war in the early stages of their proliferation since they had small deterrent forces with imperfect command and control. Of course, he also advocated that the US provide them with various kinds of technology to secure their nuclear forces.




Visit this blog's homepage.

Filed as: nuclear proliferation

Most influential IR scholars

The November/December Foreign Policy (free registration required) has a piece worth reading called "Inside the Ivory Tower," by Susan Peterson, Michael J. Tierney, and Daniel Maliniak (all of the college of William and Mary). The article begins with a statement and asks an interesting question:

Professors of international relations shape future policy debates and mold the next generation of leaders. So who are these dons of diplomacy, and what do they believe?

Bill Petti mentioned this piece over a month ago on Duck of Minerva (my second home). The complete report is on Mike Tierney's website.

I won't get into the details of the piece, but want to focus on one survey result, which allowed the authors to identify the "top 25 scholars with the greatest impact on the discipline over the past 20 years."

In this post, I have listed the rank order of the top 25 scholars, with the date of their birth and current institution. For the top 10, I have included my subjective listing of the scholar's most influential IR publication (and date published). Many of these scholars, of course, are notable for many other publications, including some in comparative politics or other fields. The authors point out this finding:

One thing that stands out about these high achievers, though, is how similar they are: Nearly all are white men older than 50.

More on that below.

1. Robert O. Keohane (1941), Princeton, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984)

2. Kenneth N. Waltz (1924), Emeritus California-Berkeley and Columbia, Theory of International Politics (1979)

3. Alexander Wendt (1958), Ohio State, Social Theory of International Politics (1999).

4. Samuel P. Huntington (1927), Harvard, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1998).

5. John J. Mearsheimer (1947), University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)

6. Joseph S. Nye (1941), Harvard, coauthor (with Keohane) of Power and Interdependence: world politics in transition (1977).

7. Robert Jervis (1940), Columbia, The Logic of Images in International Relations (1970).

8. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1946), New York University and Stanford's Hoover Institution, The War Trap (1981)

9. Bruce M. Russett (1935), Yale, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (1994).

10. Robert Gilpin (1930), Emeritus Princeton, The Political Economy of International Relations (1987).

Other than Wendt, who is a genuine anomoly (age 47), the youngest man on this list is Mearsheimer (age 58). Though I've listed books written in the 1990s and aughts, Huntington published the classic Political Order in Changing Societies in 1968, and both Russett and Mearsheimer were well-known liberals and realists long before penning their recent major works. Half of the works in the top 10 could be read when I started graduate school, more than 20 years ago.

None of the scholars ranked 11 through 25 received mention by even 10% of the respondents to the survey. Still, all are male. Most are more than 50 years old and were well-known when I was in grad school.

11. Peter J. Katzenstein (1945), Cornell
12. Stephen D. Krasner (1942), Stanford
13. James N. Rosenau, George Washington
14. John Ruggie (1944), Harvard
15. Michael Doyle (1948), Columbia
16. James D. Fearon, Stanford
17. Immanuel Wallerstein (1930), Yale
18. Robert Cox (1926), Emeritus York (Toronto)
19. Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980), Chicago
20. Francis Fukuyama (1952), Johns Hopkins SAIS
21. J. David Singer (1925), Michigan
22. Stephen Walt (1955), Harvard
23. Jack L. Snyder, Columbia
23. Robert Axelrod (1943), Michigan
23. Stanley Hoffman (1928), Harvard

Walt is the youngest man listed and he just turned 50. I couldn't find birth dates for Rosenau, Fearon and Snyder. In 1999, Fearon won the Karl Deutsch Award for young IR scholars, so it is apparently safe to assume that he is closer to 40 than 50. Rosenau's first book in the Library of Congress catalog was published in 1951 and Snyder's first publication for RAND came out in 1976. In comments at the Duck of Minerva, I wrote:

there aren't any women and I think there are some major oversights. I'm guessing that in 10 years, many of these scholars will be on the list: Mike Barnett, Jeff Checkel, Marty Finnemore, David Held, Andrew Moravcsik, Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

If you don't recognize those names, they are younger than those listed above, some are women, some are based abroad, and most are sympathetic to theoretical traditions that are neither realist nor liberal. They've read Wendt (and Ruggie and Cox) and are influenced by the "constructivist turn" in IR. The William and Mary team made note:

When respondents were asked who is currently doing the most interesting research, four women, led by Martha Finnemore at George Washington University and Kathryn Sikkink at the University of Minnesota, scored highly.

Does it matter that the field of IR is dominated by white males eligible for AARP cards? Disclosure: I'm only a few years away from that demographic.

A better question: how much does it matter?

Let me ask readers two different questions:

What are the most influential IR books and articles published in the past 15 years (since 1990)?

Who are the field's most important thinkers under age 50?

Feel free to leave comments or to send me an email.


Update: Thanks to a reader, I fixed Wendt's birth year. The prior figure (1966) certainly didn't seem right given the publication of the agent structure IO article in 1987.

Visit this blog's homepage.

Lying in International Politics

At the 2004 American Political Science Assocation Annual Meeting, University of Chicago Professor John J. Mearsheimer delivered a paper on "Lying in International Politics."

It's a short but interesting read, and I'd also recommend checking out this interview with the scholar at American Amnesia (note: it's a two part post).

Mearsheimer was an outspoken critic of the plan to attack Iraq -- in fall 2002, right up to the attack in March 2003. He is matter-of-fact about his losing effort:

...any President who really wants to go to war can use the bully pulpit to arouse the American people and strike fear in their hearts. And the Bush Administration, which is very good at manipulating public opinion, did a brilliant job in the case of Iraq.

For those reasons, the Bush Administration had little difficulty steamrolling the opposition. I was one of the people who spoke out most vociferously against an attack on Iraq, and I felt at the time like I was a mere speed bump on the road to war. The Bush Administration just rolled over people like me without much effort.

The interview features Mearsheimer explaining in some detail how he thinks the administration deceived Americans.

As for the future of Iraq, Mearsheimer isn't particularly optimistic about the prospects for democracy. This remark reminded me of my viewing "The Battle of Algiers" Friday night:

Wolfowitz failed to understand that nationalism, not democracy, is the most powerful political ideology in the world. Nationalism means that when the United States invades a country in the Middle East like Iraq and stays there for any appreciable period of time, it quickly goes from being a liberator to being an occupier. Once you become seen as an occupier by the local population, you invariably generate an insurgency, because that is how the occupied rebel against the occupier. We have seen this situation countless times in the 20th century. The insurgents invariably turn to terrorism because it is the weapon of the weak. Of course, that is exactly what has happened in Iraq. But Wolfowitz did not see this problem coming because of his emphasis on the power of democratic ideals and his failure to appreciate the strength of nationalism.

Want something optimistic to take from the exchange? Mearsheimer thinks public opinion can force the US out of Iraq in the foreseeable future:

I think that the public is likely to say at some point in the next few years that enough is enough and force the Administration to exit Iraq.

Generally, however, Mearsheimer is quite the pessimist:

aA: I have to admit, your book depressed me a little bit.

jM: Yes, it's a depressing book, as the title makes clear.

aA: I see where you are coming from, that people have this impression that you are condoning the sort of bad alternative when really you are suggesting that the bad alternative is better than the worse. Right?

jM: I often say to students that international politics is all about choosing among lousy alternatives. The key question is: which is the least bad alternative?

The Chicago professor concludes that the attack on Iraq has probably motivated some states to hurry their nuclear programs along. So, it has worsened proliferation.

Don't forget to read the paper too. Maybe I'll blog about it soon too.

Classes Begin

It's the first day of class. I'm teaching an undergraduate course on American Foreign Policy. Anyone interested can look at the syllabus. I'm not using a lot of web links this year since I found a decent companion reader.

My second class is a master's-level seminar on International Relations Theory. Again, the syllabus is on-line. Because the students may or may not have a background in IR, I have them read an advanced textbook that covers a lot of key theories. Additionally, they read journal articles each week.

Next Monday is MLK Holiday, but in two weeks the grad seminar will be talking about realism (and neorealism). That means lots of Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Since my forthcoming conference paper for the International Studies Association is about the post-cold war "failure" of realist policy advice vis-a-vis US foreign policy, I may well blog on this topic in the next two weeks.

Short version: the realists expect the US to start worrying a great deal about China (and stop trading so much), are fairly unconcerned about nuclear proliferation (Ukraine, Germany, etc.), and supported deterrence/containment for Iraq (rather than war). They have expected NATO's demise since 1990 and criticize the apparent neoimperial direction of US foreign policy.

The neorealists, in particular, offer a coherent set of ideas that seems to have been dismissed by the foreign policy hierarchy in the US.

China's Take on Security Rivalry With US

As I've said, in a couple of months I am slated to deliver a paper on the US foreign policy advice rendered by international relations realists.

So far, I've been reading a number of articles by or about John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Mearsheimer is one of the most prominent academic realists, has written a key book on the theory, and often provides foreign policy advice.

As I've noted before, Mearsheimer says that foreign policy elites talk like liberals (emphasizing democracy), but act like realists, worrying about power. That's an important part of the forthcoming conference paper, but I'm not going into that now.

Mearsheimer was a notable critic of the Iraq war because he believed in the continued success of containment and deterrence. But that's not Mearsheimer's only relevant foreign policy advice. He also urges the US to start preparing for a new rivalry with China. At minimum, this would mean reversing long-time trading practices so as not to make China stronger.

Last week, the Chinese People's Daily ran an article disputing Mearsheimer's claim that the US is soon to enter a major security rivalry with China:

John J. Mearsheimer, professor of political science of Chicago University said that as China is gaining rapid development in the economic field, whereas the United States cannot tolerate the existence of rival that maches it in force, the result will be fierce and dangerous competition for security which is similar to the confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War period.

The article is fairly long, but it is worth noting a few of the highlights. Primarily, the author, Zhou Yihuang, argues that economic interdependence and trade make such Sino-American rivalry unlikely. Rather, US-Chinese trade produces a "strongly mutual benefit":

The main shortcoming of this view is that it fails to notice the unprecedented changes that have taken place in today's world. It is these changes that have created the possibility and necessity for cooperation between the world's powers amid their confrontation. The key factors for these changes are economic globalization and the accompanying progress of science and technology. After World War II, science and technology have developed by leaps and bounds and productive forces have experienced unprecedented growth, thus giving rise to a series of changes in the world economic relations and international relationship, including ties between big powers.

Of course, the argument is framed in a weird mix of socialist rhetoric, dependent upon the logic of market economics

By relying on the enormous economic strength formed by scientific and technological progress, the big bourgeoisie in major capitalist countries reaped profits worldwide, they do not need to grab colonies or expand territory as colonialist and imperialist powers did in history, and so will not spark fierce conflicts or even leading to world war. China is a developing socialist country whose production aims to meet people's growing material and cultural needs, it does not seek hegemony or outward expansion, still less to engage in confrontation with the United States in this regard.

As Yihuang argues, the US doesn't need to engage in competition because it has adopted fiscal (it mentions tax cuts!) and social welfare measures to prevent economic crisis from triggering mass unrest.

The people in big capitalist countries universally oppose war and demand peace. China is a peace-loving country and the Chinese people long for a peaceful world environment for economic development. So there is no social basis for China-US confrontation.

The author also raises some important points about international politics:

compared with the United States, China lags far behind in strength whether in terms of science and technology, economy and military. China's present GDP is only one-ninth of the United States', and China's nuclear weaponry is only an odd of that of the United States.

He noted that at that time the United States and the Soviet Union were both superpowers, and both had military strength and overall national strength which were greater than other big countries' strengths added together. While China is still a developing country...

Watch this space for more stuff on realists and their foreign policy advice.

Probable coming attraction: Nuclear proliferation -- why more may be better? Specifically, realists have supported proliferation to Ukraine and Germany.

The Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy

I finally checked out the web pages for the nonpartisan Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. The group includes several dozen foreign policy scholars and analysts. This text is from their "About us" link:

The Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy is a group of scholars, policy makers and concerned citizens united by our opposition to an American empire. The Coalition is dedicated to promoting an alternative vision for American national security strategy that is consistent with American traditions and values.

Here are the lead paragraphs from their Statement of Principles:

Against the backdrop of an ever-bloodier conflict in Iraq, American foreign policy is moving in a dangerous direction toward empire.

Worrisome imperial trends are apparent in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy. That document pledges to maintain America's military dominance in the world, and it does so in a way that encourages other nations to form countervailing coalitions and alliances. We can expect, and are seeing now, multiple balances of power forming against us. People resent and resist domination, no matter how benign.

Of particular interest to me is the Coalition's call for debate as a means for people to resist the move toward empire:

The need for a change in direction is particularly urgent because imperial policies can quickly gain momentum, with new interventions begetting new dangers and, thus, the demand for further actions. If current trends are allowed to continue, we may well end up with an empire that most Americans-especially those whose sons and daughters are, or will be, sent into harm's way-don't really favor. The issue must be the subject of a broad public debate. The time for debate is now.

The American people have not embraced the idea of an American empire, and they are unlikely to do so. Since rebelling against the British Empire, Americans have resisted the imperial impulse, guided by the Founders' frequent warnings that republic and empire are incompatible. Empire is problematic because it subverts the freedoms and liberties of citizens at home while simultaneously thwarting the will of people abroad. An imperial strategy threatens to entangle America in an assortment of unnecessary and unrewarding wars.

As I've noted before, many international relations (IR) theorists think that public debate about foreign policy doesn't matter much, as states will simply pursue power/interest/security.

In any case, the list of signatories is fairly impressive and includes a lot of IR scholars:

Robert J. Art, Brandeis University
Andrew Bacevich, Boston University
Richard K. Betts, Columbia University
Seyom Brown, Brandeis University
Michael Desch, The University of Kentucky
Eugene Gholz, University of Kentucky
David Hendrickson, Colorado College
Robert Jervis, Columbia University
Charles Kupchan, Georgetown University
James Kurth, Swarthmore College
John J. Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
Daniel Nelson, University of New Haven
Robert Paarlberg, Wellesley College
Barry R. Posen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jack L. Snyder, Columbia University
Robert W. Tucker, Johns Hopkins University
Stephen Van Evera, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Stephen Walt, Harvard University
Kenneth N. Waltz, Columbia University

Disclosure: I have been on panels or worked with many of the people on that list.

The list also includes Doug Bandow (former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan), Ted Galen Carpenter and several other people from the Cato Institute, former US Senators Mike Gravel (Alaska) and Gary Hart (Colorado), Theresa Hitchens (Center for Defense Information, or CDI), and journalists from both The American Prospect, and The American Conservative.

Again: People from CDI and Cato? Progressive and Conservative? Republicans and Democrats? In IR terms, idealists and realists?

Ultimately, the group plans to host conferences and policy forums, publish articles, and appear in the media to advance their viewpoint.

I hope they find an eager audience.

How do I join?

War rhetoric

Many international relations theorists are self-proclaimed "realists." Traditionally, realists focus most of their attention on the self-interested behavior of powerful nation-states -- who are far more likely to get what they want in world politics. Yet, their behavior can be constrained by the "balance of power." Essentially, great powers can be deterred, depending upon the international context, even though they have a lot of clout and freedom of action.

Realists typically clash with idealists, who believe that the domestic characteristics of states matter a great deal. Democracies behave differently than non-democracies. For example, they do not go to war with one another. Idealists also value international institutions, which realists typically view as fairly unimportant since interstate cooperation tends to create disparate benefits among them.

Anyway, realists reject the idealist argument since they think all states behave about the same. University of Chicago realist John J. Mearsheimer argues, for example, that "you can't discriminate between morally virtuous states and malign states in the international system. For Realists, all states are basically black boxes that behave the same way. If the United States has to be ruthless, the United States will be ruthless. That's the argument that Realists make."

This has profound implications for understanding American foreign policy (even though the theory purports to explain international relations, not the behavior of a single state) because, as Mearsheimer argues, idealism is more widely embraced by the American people and makes for better political rhetoric.

However, Mearsheimer clearly believes that the US embraces realism even as its leaders sometimes mouth idealist words:

"We behave in the world according to Realistic dictates on almost every occasion. What's affected by the point you're making is that rhetoric. In other words, we act according to the dictates of realpolitik, but we justify our policies in terms of liberal ideologies. So what is going on here is that in many cases, elites speak one language [in public], and act according to a different logic and speak a different language behind closed doors."

Why am I bringing this up? Well, Mearsheimer was one of the most prominent academic critics of the buildup to war in Iraq. With Stephen Walt of Harvard, he authored op-ed pieces, wrote a fairly long article for Foreign Policy, and circulated a widely debated paper within academic circles. Walt and Mearsheimer thought Iraq could be readily deterred or contained and that war was unnecessary. He has since called the attack a big mistake.

Mearsheimer would likely argue that the US behavior was exceptional in a wide context. After all, if he was providing realist advice, and if policymakers almost always act on realist advice, then the most recent case must have been very unusual. A true anamoly.

Then again, there might be a problem with realism -- and its policy advice. Mearsheimer famously argued in 1990 that Germany should develop nuclear weapons to assure a balance of power in Europe (he also predicted the collapse of NATO). A few years later, in argued that the Ukraine should keep its nuclear weapons to balance Russia.

For some time, Mearsheimer's been arguing that the US should be worrying about the future containment of China. In his latest book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer argues "that a rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century."

By his own admission, the US has not been behaving as if this is the case:

"This analysis suggests that the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. For much of the past decade, however, the United States has pursued a strategy intended to have the opposite effect....This U.S. policy on China is misguided."

A graduate student and I have started looking somewhat systematically at realist policy advice, so I'm not sure what to conclude from all this yet.

It might be, however, that Mearsheimer is tired of having his realist advice ignored. In Thursday's New York Times (registration required), he defends international institutions and genuine cooperation. [Remember: In the academic world, he is one of the staunchest critics of these organizations. He titles one famous piece "The False Promise of International Institutions."]:

"But as we're finding out with regard to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, we need the Europeans and we need institutions like the U.N. The fact is that the United States can't run the world by itself, and the problem is, we've done a lot of damage in our relations with allies, and people are not terribly enthusiastic about helping us now."

Perhaps Mearsheimer is a closet liberal? He certainly admires many idealist virtues, such as public debate about ideas and the scrutiny of public officials.

"The beauty of the American system is that we have all these private institutions, and even public institutions like Berkeley, where with the tenure system, professors are free to say whatever they want, and suffer hardly any consequences in terms of losing their jobs. Therefore, I think we have a very important responsibility to talk about important issues, and to challenge conventional wisdoms that other people might be unwilling to challenge. We have a real social responsibility here.

I'm not making the argument here, by the way, for coming up with particular answers to important questions. In fact, if different scholars come up with different answers, fine. But in a democracy like the United States, you want to have a very healthy public debate about the key issues of the day. And I think that scholars can go a long way towards making that debate richer and healthier."

Heck, he's even said on television that the anti-war movement can limit political leaders' decisions about war and peace.