Sabbatical project

In fall 2011, I will be on sabbatical. Given that courses are over and my near-term service obligations are coming to a close soon, I will be able to work on this project as much as I'd like beginning in a couple of weeks.

Curious readers might want to know my plans. Right?

Well, I will be working on a book-length project tentatively titled The Comedy of Global Politics. Essentially, it is a call for a new narrative framework in IR that is consistent with critical theory. It is based on a series of papers that I have written and delivered at academic conferences over the past few years.

Realist theorists of international relations are pessimists and embrace tragic narratives to help explain IR. The University of Chicago neorealist John Mearsheimer, for instance, called his major theoretical work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Classically, the main character of a tragedy is a person of nobility, the story is set in the "great hall" or on the battlefield, and the plot features the downfall of the protagonist -- often his death. Realist theory is primarily about great powers, their story is set in the competitive "high politics" arena of the international system, and the plots are typically gloomy (featuring war, imperial overstretch, etc.). The parallels are obvious.

By contrast, comedic narratives often focus on ordinary people and allow for happy endings -- or they reveal and critique the foibles of elites. Satire, farce and black comedy can be subversive.

In a paper presented a few years ago, I argued that great power politics during the war on terror seems like a ludicrous mismatch between events, state practices, and IR theory. Despite realist expectations, major powers are not engaging in balancing behavior, great power war itself seems obsolete, the US and China are major trading partners and not foes, NATO is thriving not disintegrating, weak and failed states, plus terrorists, are viewed as the major threats to major states, etc.

In other chapters, I will use a comedic perspective to view the buildup to the Iraq war as farce, examine the wide recognition that nuclear deterrence is an absurd strategy, and explain the U.S. view of Pakistan in 2001 as a potentially ridiculous case of mistaken identity. Another chapter examines how the pre-war anti-war movement in 2003 potentially took advantage of what another scholar has called an "ironic speech situation" to allow for broad public criticism of planned US policy in a difficult context. Finally, the ongoing development of "cooperative security" as a grand strategy for major states potentially provides a pathway to incorporate the needs and interests of ordinary people in IR.


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Farce

My paper (“The Buildup to the Iraq War as Farce”) for the ISAC/ISSS conference in Providence is complete.

Based on the literature I reviewed in the section, here's my summary paragraph about farce:

A farce is a fast-paced and outrageous story featuring characters that freely employ hyperbole and make nonsensical claims about their situation. Protagonists and antagonists can often be described as reckless fools or devious knaves, though the regular instances of mistaken identity may blur the distinction for members of the audience. Frequently, the threat of physical violence or aggression looms over the story.

Hopefully, I've demonstrated that the buildup to the Iraq war can readily be viewed as farce.

The paper also gives some attention to critic Eric Bentley's "comic catharsis" thesis. Here's an old (March 10, 1961) story from the Harvard Crimson, published after a Bentley campus forum:

Bentley pointed out that by picturing an absurd situation, farce fulfills repressed wishes, although in disguise. "The contrast is between tone and context: the actor threatens murder in a playful tone, but the murderous wishes are true. Farce is a dialogue between aggressiveness and flippancy."

Farce cannot function without this aggressiveness. Bentley stated. He agreed with Freud that innocent jokes do not make us laugh. "We want satire, obscenity, and attack."

Obviously, the buildup to the Iraq war seemed pretty serious at the time, but I think much can be revealed and learned by reading it as farce. I'll try to have a link to the paper next week.

Update: I put a copy on Google Docs.


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Conference paper

In the next six weeks or so, I have to write a paper for mid-October delivery at the 2010 annual conference of the International Security Studies Section of ISA and the International Security and Arms Control Section of APSA. That's a mouthful, eh?

As my title and abstract reveal, the paper is part of the ongoing comedy book project. Almost every conference paper I've delivered over the past few years fits into the project.

“The Buildup to the Iraq War as Farce”

Realist international relations theorists such as Jervis, Lebow, Mearsheimer, and Morgenthau commonly describe world politics in terms of tragedy. Dramatically, tragic narratives focus on the downfall or death of an elite character, often caused by the protagonist’s inherent character flaws. The stories are set in the Great Hall or on the battlefield and reveal how little control (despite concerted attempts) the protagonist has over difficult situations and conflict. Despite the obvious parallels with realist views of IR, however, the events of global politics often seem more like farce than tragedy. Farcical narratives often focus on elites, but place the characters in improbable or ludicrous situations that may be exaggerated for comic effect – even though the threat of violent action that would shock the audience may loom over the tale. These are usually frantically paced stories serving to reveal the ridiculous and to critique the characters and the situation. A farce often turns on intentional acts of deception, but does not end in the complete downfall or death of the protagonist.

This paper will explain the buildup to the Iraq war in terms of farce – focusing on the period between August 2002 and March 2003. As is now well-known, the war was premised on evidence and rationales that have been largely undermined by subsequent revelations and events. In retrospect, the claims were improbable and ludicrous. Can international relations scholars recognize a farce while they are observing it?


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